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CLOSING THE LOOPHOLE IN MASSACHUSETTS
PROTECTION ORDER LEGISLATION TO
PROVIDE GREATER SECURITY FOR VICTIMS
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT: HAS MASSACHUSETTS
GENERAL LAWS CHAPTER 258E CLOSED IT
ENOUGH?
I. INTRODUCTION
Jane' was fourteen years old when two of her middle school
classmates kidnapped her while she was walking to a friend's house one
afternoon. The perpetratorstook her to a home owned by a relative, where
they repeatedly raped and assaulted her at knifepoint. The boys kept her
hostage in the home, going so far as to rip the phone out of the wall so that
she could not call for help. Upon her escape, the perpetrators were
arrestedand charged with rape, kidnapping, indecent assault and battery,
assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, breaking and entering, and
intimidating a witness. They eventually entered into a plea bargain as
youthful offenders, and were placed on probationfor one year. They spent
no time in jail.
Despite a no-contact order issued in connection with the criminal
case, the perpetratorsproceeded to threaten, intimidate, and harass Jane
for reporting her assault to the police. The perpetrators showed up to
school events, knowing that Jane was in attendance, and they engaged in
deliberate acts of intimidation, including yelling obscenities at Jane in
front of the entire crowd. On other occasions, they sat directly behind her
at sporting events and stared at her until she left. The perpetrators also
followed both Jane and her mother while driving, repeatedly drove by
Jane's house and, on occasion, got out of the car and stood in front of the
home.2

I Although this story is based upon actual events, all names have been changed to protect the
privacy of the parties.
2 This is the true story of a client acquired by Boston Law firm Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris,
Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. ("Mintz Levin"). Editorial, Defense Against Stalkers, BOS. GLOBE,
Feb. 12, 2006, at El0 (noting client's inability to gain protections through current restraining
order scheme); John M. Guilfoil, New Law Gives More Protection to Victims of Stalking, Abuse,
BOS. GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2010, at B4 (noting Mintz Levin's difficulties in obtaining necessary

protections for sexual assault victim). At the time, no protection order statute existed in
Massachusetts that offered protections to victims of sexual assault who were not related to, living
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Despite these terrorizing events, prior to May 2010, Jane and

sexual assault victims like her could not seek a criminally enforceable
protection order because they were not related to, living with, or
romantically involved with their attackers.' Prior to May 2010, the only
criminally-enforceable protection order available in Massachusetts to
victims of sexual assault-other than a more complex family law or
criminal proceeding-was the Chapter 209A Abuse Prevention Order,
which requires that the plaintiff be married, related, living with, dating, or
4
have a child in common with the person from whom they need protection.

However, with the passage of Massachusetts General Laws
Chapter 258E ("Chapter 258E") 5 in May 2010, victims of sexual assault
falling outside the definition of domestic violence won major legal
protections in their ability to file a criminally enforceable civil protection
order against their attacker. 6
Chapter 258E, entitled "Harassment
Prevention Orders," now provides victims of sexual assault 7 and stalking a
right to file for a civil order of protection, regardless of their relationship to
the perpetrator.8 Because the majority of sexual assault victims-like

with, or romantically involved with their assailant. See Defense Against Stalkers, supra. Jane,
therefore, was unable to obtain a civil order of protection that would impose criminal sanctions on
the perpetrators if violated. Id. Though Mintz Levin eventually negotiated a private settlement in
which the assailants agreed to stay away from Jane, the settlement did not provide for criminal
sanctions if the perpetrators violated the agreement. Id. Recognizing that most victims would not
have the opportunity to reach a private settlement with their attackers, the attorneys at Mintz
Levin used Jane's story to advocate for the inclusion of sexual assault victims in a new,
specifically-tailored statute that would provide civil protection orders for victims who did not
have the requisite relationship with the perpetrator to obtain a Chapter 209A Abuse Prevention
Order. See Guilfoil, supra.
3 See Martin W. Healy, Commentary, New HarassmentProtectionsSigned into Law, MASS.
LAW. WKLY., Mar. 29, 2010, at 39 (describing unavailability of protection orders for nondomestic abuse victims prior to Chapter 258E); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 1-10
(2010) (enumerating requirements for sole protection order available prior to 2010).
4 See ch. 209A, §§ 1, 3 (enumerating requirements for Chapter 209A protection order).
5 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, §§ 1-12 (2010).
6 See id. §§ 1, 3 (enabling survivors of sexual assault to obtain protection order regardless of
relationship with perpetrator).
7 The author notes that sexual assault is a common occurrence within the domestic violence
context and that it is not limited to those persons outside of a dating or marriage relationship.
However, for the purposes of this Note, the term "sexual assault" will be used to refer to victims
of sexual assault falling outside the definition of domestic violence. The author also notes that
both victims and perpetrators of sexual assault may be of either gender. However, because the
majority of reported sexual assault victims are female, and the perpetrators male, for purposes of
uniformity this note will refer to victims using the female pronoun and to perpetrators using the
male pronoun. See generally VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., BEYOND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM: TRANSFORMING OUR NATION'S RESPONSE TO RAPE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
REPRESENTING SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS 1-1 (Susan H. Vickers et al. eds., 2003) (discussing
choice of terminology regarding victims and perpetrators).
8 See ch. 258E, § 3 (enumerating Chapter 258E protections).
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Jane-are not related to, living with, or romantically involved with their
assailant, Chapter 258E closed a "glaring loophole" in the law of
Massachusetts and afforded these victims "the full extent of the justice

system."9
Although Chapter 258E represents a major victory in the fight for
the rights of sexual assault victims, the law, as written, has the potential to
be misapplied to this crucial cohort of persons. 10 This Note weighs the
fundamental protections that the statute provides to victims of sexual
assault against the flaws related to the law's drafting, and it notes the
statute's potential for improvement." Part II outlines the complexities
surrounding the problem of sexual assault and discusses the ways in which
civil protection orders serve a vital purpose for these victims. 12 Part III
provides a detailed history of the loopholes in protection order legislation
in Massachusetts prior to the passage of Chapter 258E.' 3 And, Part IV
examines how Chapter 258E closed those loopholes. 14 Finally, Part V
discusses the flaws of the statute as applied to sexual assault victims,
attempts to balance these concerns with practical benefits gained by the
law, and advocates that sexual assault victims in Massachusetts would be
better served with a protection order statute specifically tailored to address
their unique needs.15
II. FACTS
16

A. Sexual Assault as an Epidemic

Research on the prevalence of rape in the United States suggests
9 See Guilfoil, supra note 2 (quoting Governor Deval Patrick on benefits of new law). In
2009, 60% of sexual assaults reported by female victims were perpetrated by an assailant who

was neither an intimate partner nor a relative. See JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & MICHAEL R. RAND,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION,

2009, at 7 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY] (outlining statistical data on

sexual assault offender-victim relationship). These victims reported being raped or sexually
assaulted by someone who was a friend, an acquaintance, or a stranger. Id.In the same study,
100% of sexual assaults reported by male survivors were perpetrated by an assailant that was

neither an intimate partner nor a relative. Id.
10 See infra Part V.
11 See
12 See
13 See
14 See
15 See

infra Parts II-V.
infra Part II.
infra Part III.
infra Part IV.
infra Part V.

16 COMM'N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,

AM. BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR

LAWYERS REPRESENTING VICTIMS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT AND STALKING

IN CIVIL PROTECTION ORDER CASES, at v (2007) [hereinafter STANDARDS OF PRACTICE].
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that between one in six and one in eight women have experienced at least
one completed rape in their lifetime. 17 Further research on the incidence of
rape among women suggests that approximately 620,000 women age
eighteen years or older are raped every year in the United States.' 8 Similar
research on the prevalence of rape among men suggests that approximately
one in forty-seven men have reported forcible penetration at least once
within their lifetime. 19
The Massachusetts Department of Public Health has recognized

sexual assault as a "serious social and public health problem in
Massachusetts., 20 The Department estimates that in Massachusetts, 14.6%
of women and 5.3% of men experience sexual assault at some point in their
lifetime. 21 Between July 1, 2009 and June 30, 2010, there were 2564
incidents of sexual assault reported to Massachusetts Department of Public
Health-funded rape crisis centers.22
Despite its prevalence, sexual assault is the "least reported, least
indicted and least convicted felony" in the United States.23 Although
17 See The Prevalence ofRape in the United States, COUNTER Quo (Dec. 22, 2011), http://

http://www.counterquo.org/referencematerials/assets/files/reference/CQ%20Rape%20Statso20December'/o202011 .pdf
[hereinafter
Counter Quo Statistics] (reporting prevalence of rape among US women). These statistics were
compiled from four methodologically reliable studies that span over fifteen years. Id. The four
studies indicated that the prevalence of rape has been relatively stable overtime. Id. However,
these studies only reflect one narrow definition of rape as "forcible penetration" and do not take
into account the broad range of sexual offenses experienced by victims. Id. at 2. The fact that
"[nlape and all forms of sexual violence remain a vastly underreported crime in this country"
further compounds this problem. Id. at 1. Therefore, although these statistics are "reliable and
valid," they reflect only a "part of the full problem of sexual violence." Id. at 2.
18 See Counter Quo Statistics, supra note 17, at 3 (reporting research on annual incidence of
rape). This figure is an underestimate of the actual incidence of rape each year, as it does not
account for female rape victims under the age of eighteen. Id. Further, there is a "critical"
distinction between the "prevalence" and the "incidence" of rape among women. Id. at 2.
"'Prevalence' refers to the number of people who are victims of rape. 'Incidence' refers to the
number of rapes (incidents) that occur." Id. Understanding this distinction is imperative because
"an individual victim may be raped multiple times in a lifetime, or over any time period." Id.
The incidence, or number of rapes, is higher in the United States than the number of people who
are rape victims, suggesting that some victims are raped more than once in their lifetime. Id.
19 Id. at 3 (reporting prevalence of male rape in United States). The U.S. Department of
Justice's annual National Crime Victimization Survey reported that in 2009, 19,820 men age
twelve years and older reported being victims of rape or sexual assault. See 2009 CRIME
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY, supra note 9, at 7 (reporting incidence of rape and sexual assault by
gender).
20 See MASS. DEP'T OF PUB. HEALTH, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT IN MASSACHUSETTS,

2009-2010, at 1 (2011).
21 Id. (describing prevalence of sexual assault among men and women in Massachusetts).
22 Id. (describing number of reported sexual assaults to Massachusetts
rape crisis centers).
23 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 1-2 (discussing failure of criminal justice
system for most sexual assault victims).
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almost every state in the nation has reworked its existing sexual assault
laws in hopes of making the criminal justice process fairer to victims, the

criminal justice process has remained a largely unsuccessful avenue for
most victims of sexual assault.24
The first level at which the criminal justice system breaks down for
25
victims of sexual assault is the victim's reluctance to report the crime.
Studies show that although reporting to law enforcement has increased
since the reforms of the 1970s, estimates of reporting rates have remained
at 16% since the early 1990S. 2 6 Even if a victim chooses to report a sexual

assault, research shows that arrest rates for forcible rape have substantially

24

See Jody Clay-Warner & Callie Harbin Burt, Rape ReportingAfter Reforms: Have Times

Really Changed?, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 150, 152 (2005) (discussing scope of rape law
reform); Ilene Seidman & Susan Vickers, The Second Wave: An Agenda for the Next Thirty Years
of Rape Law Reform, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 467, 467 (2005) (discussing rape reform
movement). The changes made to rape laws since the 1970s have focused on four areas: "(a) a
redefinition of rape, (b) the elimination or modification of the resistance requirement, (c) the
elimination or modification of the corroboration requirement, and (d) the establishment of rapeshield laws that limited or prohibited the admissibility of a victim's sexual history on crossexamination." Clay-Warner & Harbin Burt, supra, at 152. Despite these changes, "studies of
rape law reform have been unable to document significant increases in reports that could be
directly attributed to the legislation." Id. at 156; see Seidman & Vickers, supra, at 467 (labeling
rape law reform as "a profound disappointment"); see also MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY,

JUSTICE, at iii

103D CONG.,

THE RESPONSE TO RAPE: DETOURS ON THE ROAD TO EQUAL

(Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter

RESPONSE TO RAPE]

("These findings reveal a

justice system that fails by any standard to meet its goals apprehending, convicting, and
incarcerating violent criminals .... "); JESSICA E. MINDLIN & LIANI JEAN HEH REEVES, THE
NAT'L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST. AT LEWIS & CLARK LAW SCHOOL, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES:
MEETING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVIVORS 17 (2005) [hereinafter
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES] ("[H]igh rates of sexual violence are not reflected in the data for state

and federal sexual assault prosecutions."). In fact, a 1993 study conducted by the United States
Senate Judiciary Committee found that "despite some reforms, serious legal barriers remained
where women sought the prosecution of an attacker." RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra, at 1. The same
study found that "[n]inety-eight percent of the victims of rape never see their attacker caught,
tried and imprisoned." Id. at iii.
25 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 24, at 17 (discussing lack of reporting as
contributing to low prosecution rate).
26 See KIMBERLY A. LONSWAY & JOANNE ARCHAMBAULT, THE "JUSTICE GAP" FOR
SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH AND REFORM

6 (n.d.) (noting

results of study on reporting to police "identical" to estimate reported in 1991); see also

DEAN

G.

KILPATRICK ET AL., DRUG-FACILITATED, INCAPACITATED, AND FORCEBLE RAPE: A NATIONAL
STUDY 2 (2007), available at www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/219181.pdf (finding 16%

reporting rate in 2007 study). "This pattern of research findings thus corroborates the conclusion
•.. that the likelihood of reporting a sexual assault to the police increased from the 1960s to the
1990s but has remained stable since that time." LONSWAY & ARCHAMBAULT, supra, at 6.
Factors influencing a victim's decision to report included, "not wanting others to know about the
rape, fear of retaliation, perception of insufficient evidence, uncertainty about how to report, and
uncertainty about whether a crime was committed or whether harm was intended." KILPATRICK
ET AL., supra, at 2-3.
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declined from the 50% range in the 1970s, to 26% in 2008.27 Assuming
there is an arrest, as many as 48% of sexual assault cases will be dismissed
before trial.28 If a sexual assault case does proceed to prosecution, of those
defendants charged with rape, research suggests that only 54% are

convicted of a felony. 29 Of those convicted, nearly 25% are not sentenced
to prison, but released on probation. 0

27 See LONSWAY

&

ARCHAMBAULT, supra

In total, research shows that of all

note 26, at 10.

This "pattern of consistent

decline" in arrest rates was not present in the ratio of arrests for other violent crimes. Id. One
possible explanation for this decline in arrest rate is that fewer rapes reported today fit into the
"cultural stereotype of 'real rape,"' as compared to the reports of rape in the 1970s. Id. For
example, evidence suggests that rapes reported today often involve non-strangers, victims who
are "incapacitated, severely disabled, or otherwise unable to consent, as well as those from
specific vulnerable populations." Id. Research shows that "police officers and other members of
society are frequently skeptical of reports that do not resemble the . . .stereotypic image [of
rape]." Id.at 11. Another potential explanation is that fewer complaints of rape are being
"fonnally documented with a police report" or "being coded as a crime and/or thoroughly
investigated." Id. at 11-12; see also RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 24, at 2 (recognizing
"prejudice" rape victims face when police refuse to take official reports). In addition, it is
possible that many reports of sexual assault are considered "unfounded as a false or baseless
report." LONSWAY & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 26, at 12; see also RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra
note 24, at 9 (finding police tendency to find alleged assault an "unfounded" rape complaint).
Commentators also suggest that an increasing number of cases are not being "formally referred to
the prosecutor's office," but instead, are "presented informally to prosecutors by law enforcement
investigators," and, therefore, cases "could thus be rejected on the basis of a single conversation."
LONSWAY & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 26, at 12. Another potential explanation for declining
arrest rates are victims' unwillingness to proceed with the case. Id. at 12-13.
28 See RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 24, at 9-10 (discussing dismissal rate of rape cases).
One study found that "[n]ine out of ten rape cases that do not result in a conviction are the result
of a dismissal rather than an acquittal." Id. at 10. Further, a rape case is 40% more likely to be
dismissed than a robbery case. Id. The study notes that cases may be dismissed for any number
of reasons, such as problems with physical evidence or lack of victim cooperation. Id. In fact,
prosecutors generally do not proceed with sexual assault cases without the consent and
cooperation of the victim. See Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of CriminalProcess: The
Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 289, 300 (1999) (discussing prosecutorial
unwillingness to go forward without consent of victim); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7,
at 9-8 (discussing victim consent central to prosecutorial indictments). However, one study found
that in rape cases, "the most common factor which prevents cases from going forward" is a prior
relationship between the victim and offender because prosecutors believe that the likelihood of
conviction is lower in acquaintance rape cases. RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 24, at 10
(discussing results of gender bias study).
29 See LONSWAY & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 26, at 20 (noting conviction rate statistics for
rape). A 1993 study conducted by the Majority Staff of the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee
found that "over half of all rape prosecutions are either dismissed before trial or result in an
acquittal." RESPONSE TO RAPE, supra note 24, at 1 (discussing findings of six-month study).
The same study found that a rape charge is 30% more likely to be dismissed than a robbery
charge. Id. (noting "serious legal barriers remained where women sought the prosecution of an
attacker").
30 See RESPONSE To RAPE, supra note 24, at iii-iv (discussing likelihood of convicted rapist
being released on probation). Nearly 25% of convicted rapists receive an average sentence of
eleven months in a local jail. Id. at iii. Taken together, these figures indicate that almost half of
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rapes committed against women, only 0.35% were reported, prosecuted,
convicted, and resulted in the incarceration of the offender. 3'
B. Why Sexual Assault Victims Need Protection Orders

Given the overwhelming majority of assailants who are not
punished criminally, sexual assault victims require protections beyond what
criminal prosecutions offer.32 This need is particularly enhanced in light of
startling evidence that sexual assault victims face significant safety risks
following an attack.33 In some cases, the assailant may pose a risk of
assaulting the victim again.34 In other cases, the assailant may utilize the

fear created by the first attack to continue to threaten, intimidate, or prevent
the victim from seeking assistance or reporting the incident to law
enforcement.35 The victim may also be vulnerable to retaliation by the
assailant if she chooses to seek assistance or report the crime to law
enforcement.3 6 Other victims often experience stalking in conjunction with

all convicted rapists spend an average of less than one year in prison. Id.
31 See LONSWAY & ARCHAMBAULT, supra note 26, at 20 (discussing research findings on
conviction and incarceration rates of rape).
32 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 1-1 (discussing sexual assault victims'
need for civil remedies outside criminal justice system); see also supra notes 23-31 and
accompanying text (discussing lack of criminal justice remedies for sexual assault survivors).
33 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 24, at 20 (discussing varying safety risks for
survivors of sexual assault). Sexual assault survivors' safety risks fall along a continuum based
on a number of factors. Id. These factors include, but are not limited to, who the assailant is;
how much the assailant knows about the survivor; the location of the sexual assault; whether the
assailant acted alone or with others; whether the assault involved the use of weapons; the extent
of physical injuries from the assault; and the degree of contact with the assailant, both before and
after the assault. Id.
34 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-1 (noting on-going threat assailant may
pose to survivor); Kelly O'Connell, A New Tool for Safety: Introducing Washington's Sexual
Assault Protection Order, ADvOC. NEWSL. (Wash. Coal. of Sexual Assault Programs, Olympia,
Wash.),
Aug.
2006,
at
2,
2,
available
at
http://svlawcenter.org/section resources/resource files/SAPONewsletter.pdf (discussing ongoing
threat of assailant). Following enactment of Chapter 258E, Massachusetts Attorney General
Martha Coakley noted that in her twenty years while serving as a prosecutor, that "[iln some
instances, we have seen that lack of protections result in further attacks or even murder." Press
Release, Office of the Governor of Massachusetts, Governor Patrick Signs Law to Strengthen
Protections for Victims of Harassment (Feb. 9, 2010) [hereinafter Patrick Press Release],
available at http://www.mass.gov/governor/pressoffice/pressreleases/2010/law-to-strengthenprotections-for-victims-of.html (quoting Attorney General Martha Coakley on positive effects of
new law).
35 See O'Connell, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing assailant's use of fear to intimidate and
threaten victim); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-1 (explaining assailant's use of
fear to prevent victim from seeking remedies).
36 See Protective Orders for Sexual Assault Victims, THE NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME
1,
1
(2005),
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their assault.3 7 Moreover, all of these risks are heightened if the victim is

subject to on-going contact with the assailant.38 The victim may be at
particular risk if the assailant knows where the victim lives, works, or goes
to school.3

9

Civil protection orders serve to protect the victim from her
assailant, and they reduce the occurrence of future violence .40 Civil
protection orders combat the serious safety risks facing sexual assault
victims because they provide police probable cause to arrest the assailant,
should he violate the order. 41 The threat of such penalties serves to
increase the victim's safety by deterring the assailant from engaging in

future acts of intimidation or harm. 42 Having such penalties attach to these
orders works as an invaluable resource for victims whose safety concerns
may not otherwise be recognized as an arrestable offense.43 In this very
crucial way, civil protection orders also make the threat to a victim's safety
more credible to the police. 44 In creating a legally-arrestable offense that is

http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?Document
ID-46683 (noting risk of retaliation by perpetrator); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at
3-3 (discussing retaliation by assailants for victims' reporting). The sexual assault victim may
also be at risk for retaliation by the assailant if she files for a protection order. See VICTIM
RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-2 (discussing risk of retaliation after filing order).
37 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 24, at 40 (discussing risk of stalking post-assault).
38 See O'Connell, supra note 34, at 2 (discussing safety risks of ongoing contact with
assailant).
39 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 1-1, 3-1 (explaining factors exacerbating
risk to victim).
40 See Jennifer Rios, Note, What's the Hold-Up? Making the Case for Lifetime Orders of
Protection in New York State, 12 CARDOZO J. OF L. & GENDER 709, 716 (2006) (discussing
protection orders as source of protection for victims); see also infra notes 77-81 and
accompanying text (explaining civil protection orders). Advocates recognize protection orders as
"effective tools in the prevention of harassment and violence." See Guilfoil, supra note 2
(quoting Mary R. Lauby, executive director of Jane Doe Inc.).
41 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 8 (2010) (authorizing officer to arrest
if probable
cause exists showing violation of order); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.748 (West 2009) (authorizing
officer to arrest without warrant if probable cause order violated); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-13-6
(2011) (authorizing officer to arrest without warrant if probable cause exists showing violation of
order).
42 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra note 24, at 22 (concluding civil protection
orders
enhance victim safety by deterring harm to victim).
43 See Sarah Deer, Expanding the Network of Safety: Tribal Protection Ordersfor Survivors
of Sexual Assault, TRIAL L. J. pt. III.D n.104, http://tlj.unm.edu/tribal-lawjournal/articles/volume 4/violence,0% 20women/index.php (last visited March 18, 2011) (noting
importance of "not hav[ing] to wait until an additional assault occurs to contact law
enforcement").
44 See id. (noting orders of protection provide credibility for victims).
An order of
protection, although theoretically just a piece of paper, serves as proof for many victims that she
needs vital protection in her everyday life, whether at school, at work, or at home. See Press
Release, Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C., Victims of Stalking and Sexual
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punishable by incarceration or a substantial fine, civil protection orders, at
the very least, provide an 45
element of leverage with which to prevent further

contact with the assailant.

In addition to the vulnerability of a victim's actual safety following
an attack, a victim's perceptions of physical safety are often virtually
destroyed.46
The victim may become "hyper-vigilant, anxious and
frightened" for weeks, months, or years after being sexually assaulted.47

Such fear is even more exacerbated for the majority of victims who know
their attackers, and who will be subject to on-going contact with them after
an assault.48 For many 4victims, this terror will never go away. 49

Assault Face Barriers to Prot. from Further Abuse and Harassment (Feb. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
Mintz
Levin
Press
Release],
available
at
http://www.mintz.com/news/557/Victims of Stalkingand Sexual Assault FaceBarriers to Pr
otection fromFurtherAbuse and Harassment (quoting stalking victim Barbara Vacarr, Ph.D.
on the legitimacy protection orders provide victims). In the words of one victim who testified at a
State House hearing concerning the passage of Chapter 258E, "I can't imagine not having ...that
piece of paper to give me some credibility that I'm in trouble and I need help." See Anne Baker,
Restraining

Orders:

Now

With

More

Umph',

DIG

BOS.

(Sept.

23,

2009),

http://digboston.com/think/2009/09/23552/ (quoting victim able to obtain a protection order
because perpetrator was former roommate).
45 See Jeremy
Shulkin, Sex, WORCESTER MAG (Sept. 9, 2010, 6:03 AM),
http://www.worcestermag.com/city-desk/top-news/Sex- 102460569.html
(quoting Executive
Director of YWCA's Daybreak Program, Ginger Navickas, on leverage provided by orders).
46 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 1-23, 3-1 (discussing shattering effect
sexual assault has on victim's sense of safety). In a proposal to both the Massachusetts Senate
and the House of Representatives concerning an early draft of a Chapter 258E-style protection
order, Governor Deval Patrick noted, that "[rape and sexual assault] threaten the very core of a
person's safety and well-being." Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Governor of Massachusetts, to the
Massachusetts Senate and House of Representatives (June 4, 2009) [hereinafter Governor Patrick
Proposal], available at http://www.mass.gov/governor/docs/legislation/O604crimebill.pdf. Others
have noted, "Stalking and sexual assault are terrorizing for a victim. We tend to focus on the
damage done by a physical act of terror but must not forget the long-term, serious psychological
and emotional effects and on-going harassment and intimidation that often occurs." Mintz Levin
Press Release, supra note 44 (quoting Representative Peter Koutoujian, Massachusetts House of
Representatives) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 1-23 (explaining persistence of hyper-

vigilance and fear occurring post-sexual assault); see also O'Connell, supra note 34, at 2 (noting
victim's fear may persist months and years after assault). The place where the perpetrator
assaulted the victim may only exacerbate this terror. See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. I.B
(discussing fear victims face). For example, if the sexual assault occurred in the victim's home,
she may never want to return to that home again. Id. Alternatively, if the assault occurred
outside of the home, the victim may struggle to leave her house. Id.
48 See O'Connell, supra note 34 (explaining continued contact with assailant heightens
victim's fear); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-1 (discussing likelihood of victim's
fear increasing if ongoing contact with perpetrator exists). Studies show that roughly threequarters of sexual assault victims must face ongoing contact with their assailant. See Jennika
Kirkbride, Civil Legal Protectionfor Victims of Sexual Violence, 3 FAM. & INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE Q. 65, 65 (2010). Indeed, for many sexual assault victims, a mere encounter with their
assailant can be as devastating and frightening as the actual attack. Id. at 67 (noting mere
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Studies show that victims who obtain civil protection orders
against their attackers subsequently experience increased feelings of safety
after obtaining the order.50 In addition, research indicates that "one of the
most significant benefits of seeking and obtaining an Order for Protection"
is that it serves to empower the victim by allowing her to initiate a course
of action after a dehumanizing attack.5' Moreover, victims often report that
civil protection orders were instrumental in helping them recover and
improve their overall feelings of well-being after an attack.5 2
Civil protection orders also operate as a valuable tool for victims of
sexual assault because they provide a remedy that is easy and quick to
obtain, and they serve as a viable alternative to the criminal justice

system. 53 In contrast to the one- to two-year time frame for a resolution
within the criminal justice system, civil protection orders are typically
granted at least temporarily on the same day as they are requested, and

most statutes provide for a final resolution within two weeks.

4

presence of assailant sufficient to harass victim); see also Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.A
("[W]omen can re-experience the mental anguish of the assault whenever they re-encounter the
perpetrator."). Moreover, repeated encounters with the assailant can further compound the terror
and mental anguish that victims face. See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.A (describing effect
multiple encounters with assailant may have on victim).
49 See Victim Tells JurorsHow Life Has Changed, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 15, 1993, at
37A (describing sexual assault survivor's experience of never-ending terror).
50 See SUSAN L. KEILITZ ET AL., NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS:
VICTvIMS' VIEWS ON EFFECTIVENESS 2 (1998) (discussing positive effects of civil protection
orders reported by victims); see also Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.A (noting effect protection
orders have on victims' feelings of security and safety). In one study, 80% of participants
reported feeling safer after obtaining an order of protection. See KEILITZ ET AL., supra
(describing findings of study).
51 See Nina W. Tarr, Civil Ordersfor Protection: Freedom or Entrapment?, 11 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 157, 158-59 (2003) (discussing empowering effect of civil protection orders for
victims).
52 See KEILITZ ET AL., supra note 50, at 1 (discussing positive effects of civil protection
orders as reported by victims). This study showed that 72% of participants reported in their
initial interview an improvement in their lives after obtaining a protection order. Id. at 2. During
follow-up interviews, the number of victims reporting improvement in their lives increased to
85%. Id. The same study showed that 90% of victims reported feeling better about themselves
after obtaining a protection order. Id. Governor Deval Patrick, in an early proposal for a Chapter
258E-style protection order statute, recognized that "protective orders serve as a vital tool to
provide victims and witnesses with the security necessary to recover and rebuild after these
traumatic, and sometimes life-threatening, incidents." Governor Patrick Proposal, supra note 46,
at 1.
53 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476 (noting speed and "less burdensome" nature
of civil protection orders); Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.B (discussing civil protection orders as
an alternative to criminal justice process); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-5 (noting
speedier and more victim-friendly aspect of protection order process compared with criminal
process).
54 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-5 (discussing length of criminal justice
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Furthermore, civil protection orders are intended to be low cost, and the
Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA") prohibits the imposition of filing
fees. 55 In contrast to other legal remedies, these orders are also designed
for a lay person to obtain without the assistance of a lawyer.56
Because civil protection orders are drafted specifically with victim
assistance in mind, they are also designed to be more victim-friendly than
the criminal justice system. 57 Court procedures, filing systems, personnel,
and hearings are tailored to ensure that the victim obtains the necessary
protections she needs. 58 Additionally, the burden of proof in protection
order hearings is typically lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard used in the criminal process. 59
Protection orders may also assist victims seeking to have an
assailant removed from their daily environment, such as at their school,
home, or place of employment. 60 Many institutions, such as housing

process compared with protection order process); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476 n.49
(comparing length of criminal process with protection order process);. Other avenues for relief,
such as filing a civil claim in the tort system or initiating disciplinary proceedings at school or the
place of employment, may take several months or even years. See Seidman & Vickers, supra
note 24, at 476 n.49 (noting length of time of other possible remedies).
55 See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.D n.104 (noting filing fees for protection orders against
public policy). Any jurisdiction that imposes a fee for the "filing, issuance, service, or
registration" of a protection order will not receive funding under VAWA. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 3796gg-5(a) (2006) ("A State ...shall not be entitled to funds ... unless [it] ...certifies that
its laws, policies, and practices do not require ... that the victim bear the costs associated with
the filing, issuance, registration, or service of a ...protection order."). Even before VAWA, it
was nationally recognized that imposing a filing fee for civil protection orders was against public
policy and diminished victim safety because fees created "an undue barrier for indigent victims."
See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.D n.104 (stating filing fees for protection orders against public
policy).
56 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 477 (noting civil protection orders "designed
to
be easily secured on a pro se basis").
57 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-5 (noting "filing procedures, court
personnel, and hearings" more victim-friendly than criminal justice process); Seidman & Vickers,
supra note 24, at 476 n. 49 (discussing legislature's intent to draft statute with victims in mind);.
In addition to the filing process and the belief that court personnel and hearings are more victim
friendly, the rules of evidence are also "applied with flexibility." Seidman & Vickers, supra note
24, at 476 n.49; see also VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-5 (discussing application
of rules of evidence in protection order hearings).
58 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476 n.49 (discussing "victim-friendly" nature of
civil protection order process).
59 See Rios, supra note 40, at 726 (discussing "lower standard" in protection order hearings);
see also, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 60.3 (West 2003) (stating burden of proof as
"reasonable cause"); TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011)
(announcing burden of proof as "reasonable grounds"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.090
(West 2007) (enumerating burden of proof as preponderance of the evidence).
60 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-3 (discussing civil protection order as
tool to remove assailant from home or work).

2012]

SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMS AND CHAPTER 258E

113

authorities, schools, and employers, attempt to limit their potential liability
to the assailant by refraining from removing the assailant from the victim's
surroundings, unless acting pursuant to a court order. 61 A civil protection
order issued by a court often gives the victim the ability to negotiate with
these organizations, and it may expedite
the process for removing the
62
life.
daily
victim's
the
from
assailant
Civil protection orders may also serve the purpose of compensating
victims for losses suffered as a result of an attack. 63 Both Chapters 209A
and 258E, as well as a number of other protection order statutes from other
states, allow for recovery of costs from the defendant for economic losses
suffered in connection with an attack.64
Additionally, public safety may benefit as a result of civil
protection orders for sexual assault victims. 65 If a victim feels safe, she is
more likely to report the attack and to cooperate with law enforcement
agencies, which in turn allows the criminal justice system to operate more
efficiently. 66 Finally, civil protection orders for sexual assault victims
"send a strong message to the perpetrator and the community that sexual
assault is not acceptable behavior., 67 Such a message may actually serve
681
as a deterrent to both the offender and other potential sexual assailants.

61

See id.(noting employer, school, and housing authority preference to rely on court order

before taking action).
62 See id. (discussing leverage protection orders provide in removing assailant from school,
work, or housing).
63 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476 (describing ability of some civil protection
orders to provide economic restitution). "The economic consequences of a sexual assault can be
staggering." VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 4-1 (discussing economic consequences
of sexual assault).
64 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-1005 (LexisNexis 2008) (authorizing court to award costs and
attorneys fees); IND. CODE § 34-26-5-9 (West 2011) (authorizing court to award attorneys fees
and reimbursement for expenses related to abuse); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 3 (2010)
(authorizing court to award monetary compensation for losses suffered as direct result of
harassment); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2010) (authorizing court to award monetary
compensation for losses suffered as direct result of such abuse).
65 See Governor Patrick Proposal, supra note 46 ("Protective orders also enhance public
safety because, when victims are safe, they are better able to participate in a criminal justice
system that holds offenders accountable.").
66 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-2 (noting security provided by
protection order may motivate victim to participate in criminal justice system); Guilfoil, supra
note 2 ("When victims are safe, they are better able and more likely to participate in criminal
justice interventions that hold offenders accountable.").
67 See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.A (discussing message protection orders send
to
community).
68 See id. (discussing deterrent effect of civil protection orders).
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C. Limitations of Sexual Assault ProtectionOrders
Protection orders will not be effective for every victim of sexual

assault.69 In some cases, a civil protection order may trigger more violence
towards the victim. 70 Similar limitations exist when the victim is assaulted
by a stranger, because the victim has no way of discovering the information
necessary to file an order against the perpetrator. 71 Additionally, depending
on the protection order process, the defendant may be given the right to
cross-examine the victim. 72 Although cross-examination in the civil
protection order context may not be as intrusive as it is in the criminal
justice process, a victim may nevertheless be unwilling to expose herself to
such vulnerability. 73 Additionally, filing a civil protection order creates an
evidentiary record that later may be used against the victim in another
course of action that she may want to pursue, such as the criminal or tort
processes. 744 Finally, no guarantee exists that a violent individual will cease
threatening the victim in response to the protection order. 75 Nevertheless,
protection orders continue to provide an extra tool for victims of sexual
assault.76 Some victims report that having the77option to turn something
down "is preferable to having no options at all."

69

See Catherine Carroll, Legal Remedies and the Empowerment Model, ADVOC. NEWSL.

(Wash. Coal. of Sexual Assault Programs, Olympia, Wash.), Aug. 2006, at 6, 6, available at
http://svlawcenter.org/section resources/resource files/SAPONewsletter.pdf (noting protection
order not a "magic wand for sexual assault survivors"); Kelly O'Connell, Message from the
Editor, ADvoc. NEWSL. (Wash. Coal. of Sexual Assault Programs, Olympia, Wash.), Aug. 2006,
at 1, 1, available at http://svlawcenter.org/section resources/resource files/SAPONewsletter.pdf
(discussing limitations of protection orders for sexual assault victims); Deer, supra note 43, at pt.
III.C (discussing limitations of sexual assault protection orders).
70 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIS, supra note 24, at 22; STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note
16, at vi-vii (noting victims "regularly murdered by their assailants" notwithstanding civil
protection order).
71 See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. 11I.C (discussing difficulty for victims of stranger rape to
obtain protection order against assailant).
72 See VICTIu\ RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-5 (discussing general right to crossexamination in Chapter 209A hearings); Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.C (noting potential for
cross-examination).
73 See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.C (explaining potential for cross-examination).
74 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-4. For example, if the petition for a
protection order contains an affidavit that varies from a police report, the affidavit could be used
in a subsequent criminal or civil trial to impeach the victim during cross-examination. Id.
75 See Carroll, supra note 69, at 6 ("[A sexual assault protection order] remedy is only
meaningful for victims if the perpetrator is likely to abide by it."); Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.C
(discussing lack of guarantee).
76 See Deer, supra note 43, at pt. III.C (suggesting protection orders provide "extra level of
security beyond status quo").
77 See id. (discussing ability to turn down option valuable for survivors of sexual assault).
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III. HISTORY OF THE LOOPHOLES
A. Civil Protection Orders, Generally
A civil protection order, commonly known as a restraining order, is
a civil remedy used to protect a victim's safety by placing a "legal burden
on the assailant to have no further contact with the victim., 78 Such orders
derive from the traditional common law civil injunction, and were adapted
in the 1970s as a mechanism to protect victims of domestic violence. 79 All

United States jurisdictions have a statute that offers civil protection orders
to victims of domestic violence.80 Although a number of states still require

the existence of a "domestic violence" relationship to exist between the
victim and perpetrator, since the 1990s a number of states have passed
subsequent legislation aimed at broadening the categories for those eligible
to obtain an order of protection.81 The crucial element of these protection

78 See RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, supra

note 24, at 22 (explaining nature of civil orders of

protection); VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-2 (discussing purpose and nature of
civil protection orders). VAWA defines a "protection order" as "any injunction, restraining
order, or any other order issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing violent
or threatening acts or harassment against, sexual violence, or contact or communication with or
physical proximity to, another person." 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5)(A) (2006); see also RIGHTS AND
REMEDIES, supra note 24, at 31 (discussing definition of protection order under VAWA).
79 See Tamara L. Kuennen, "No-Drop" Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of
JudicialIntervention in the Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 47
(2007) (identifying "deep historical roots" of civil protection orders dating to English Court of
Chancery); Rios, supra note 40, at 726 (discussing development of protection orders as
"technique" to assist domestic violence victims). The District of Columbia passed the first
modem civil order of protection statute in 1970. Kuennen, supra, at 48. By 1980, forty-five
states had created similar civil order of protection statutes for victims of domestic violence. Id.
Today, all states have legislation creating civil orders of protection for victims of domestic
violence. Id.
"0 See Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A
Callfor Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 93, 100 (recognizing all fifty states have domestic
violence protection orders); STANDARDS OF PRACTICE, supra note 16, at vi (noting availability of
domestic violence protection orders in every state).
81 See Smith, supra note 80, at 102 (recognizing states' movement towards broadening
eligibility requirements). Twelve states still require that the victim have a domestic violence
relationship with the perpetrator before obtaining an order of protection. See, e.g., ALA. CODE.
§§ 30-5-1 to -8 (LexisNexis 2011); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6106 (West 2010); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 48-27-202 (LexisNexis 2009 & Supp. 2011). Twelve other states allow victims of
harassment and stalking to obtain a protection order without a domestic violence relationship.
See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1809 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28311.02 (2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1750 (2003 & Supp. 2011); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-507
(2011). A majority of states have a hybrid statute, placing sexual assault protections within a
statute providing protections to other categories of victims. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§
18.65.850-.870 (2010); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 604-10.5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2950a (West 2010). Only five states have a statute that is specifically
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orders is that a violation of the order is a criminal offense, punishable by
incarceration.82
B. History of Civil Orders ofProtectionin Massachusetts (Chapter209A)
In 1978, Massachusetts passed its first criminally-enforceable
protection order statute, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 209A
("Chapter 209A"), entitled "Abuse Prevention."83 The Legislature enacted
the statute to combat the growing problem of domestic violence and
intended the law to "provide victims with an accessible means of stopping
the violence without resort to the more onerous criminal process or the
protracted and often unwanted civil remedies."8 4
To qualify for an order of protection under Chapter 209A, a person

directed at providing sexual assault victims with certain protections. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §
784.046 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §200.378 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); TEx. CODE CRE\M. PROC. ANN. art. 7A.01 (West
2005 & Supp. 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.90.005 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012).
82 See Tarr, supra note 51, at 191 (discussing criminal charges as "[o]ne of the greatest
developments of the Order for Protection statutes"); see also supra notes 41-45 and
accompanying text (discussing criminal penalties associated with civil protection orders).
83 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 1-10 (2010); see also Margaret B. Drew & Marilu E.
Gresens, Denying Choice of Forum: An Interference by the Massachusetts Trial Court with
Domestic Violence Victims' Rights and Safety, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 293, 295-97 (2010)
(discussing 209A and remedies prior to passage). The Abuse Prevention Act also served to
criminalize existing injunctive orders issued pursuant to other domestic relations proceedings.
See John P. Zanini, Overview of Mass. Gen. L. Ch. 209A, the Abuse Prevention Statute, and the
ProsecutorialRole of the DistrictAttorney's Office, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 261, 264 (1993). For
example, the Abuse Prevention statute added criminal penalties to orders to vacate and orders of
restraint issued in the context of an on-going divorce proceeding. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ 34C (2010) (criminalizing violations of divorce proceeding orders and noting section added by
Abuse Prevention statute, St. 1978, c. 447 § 1); see also Zanini, supra, at 264 (discussing abuse
prevention statute's criminalizing effect on existing orders). Chapter 209A also allows police
officers to arrest any person who the officer believes to have violated a "temporary or permanent
vacate, restraining, or no-contact order or judgment issued in connection with a case involving
divorce, spouses living apart, or children born out of wedlock. See ch. 209A, § 6(7) (allowing
arrest for violations of various court orders); Zanini, supra, at 264 (discussing criminal penalties
associated with violation of various court orders).
84 See Drew & Gresens, supra note 83, at 297 (discussing goals behind passage of Chapter
209A); see also Jones v. Gallagher, 768 N.E.2d 1088, 1090 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) ("[The] statute
... has been described as a 'statutory mechanism by which victims of family or household abuse
can enlist the aid of the State to prevent further abuse."'). Massachusetts was one of the first
states to enact legislation to combat the problem of domestic violence and has since been known
as a progressive leader in victim protection. See Drew & Gresens, supra note 83, at 295-96
(discussing goals behind passage of Chapter 209A); see also Beth I.Z. Boland & Susan M.
Finegan, Survey of Key Developments in the SJC s'Recent Approach to Domestic Violence Issues:
Jacobsen, Frizado, Kwiatkowski, and R.H. v. B.F., 40 BOs. B.J., Jan./Feb. 1996, at 10, 10
("Batterers in Massachusetts now face some of the strongest anti-domestic violence laws and
programs in the country.").
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must suffer from "abuse from an adult or minor family or household
member. 85 The statute defines "family or household members" as people
who
(a) are or were married to one another; (b) are or were
residing together in the same household; (c) are or were
related by blood or marriage; (d) having a child in common
regardless of whether they have ever married or lived
together; or (e) are or have been in a substantive dating or
engagement relationship.86
Prior to Chapter 258E, a victim not dating, living with, or related to
her attacker could not obtain protection without participating in the
criminal justice system. 87 Yet a victim who suffered from the same crime
at the hands of her intimate partner, relative, or roommate was able to
secure these vital protections. 8
C. Remedies for Sexual Assault Victims in MassachusettsPriorto Chapter
258E
Before enactment of Chapter 258E, victims of sexual assault who
did not qualify for a Chapter 209A protection order in Massachusetts were
faced with "inadequate alternatives" in seeking protection from their
attackers.89 If a sexual assault victim chose to participate in the criminal
justice system, the court could issue an order requiring the perpetrator to
stay away from the victim. 90 If the perpetrator violated such an order by
contacting or intimidating the victim, the defendant could be arrested and
incarcerated. 91 However, these orders only applied while the criminal case
85

Ch.209A, § 3. "Abuse" isdefined by the statute as "(a) attempting to cause or causing

physical harm; (b) placing another in fear of imminent serious physical harm; (c) causing another
to engage involuntarily in sexual relations by force, threat or duress." Id.§ 1.
86 Id. § 1.
87 See Elissa Flynn-Poppey & Stefanie Giuliano Abhar, Chapter 258E Harassment
Prevention Orders Balancing the Rights of Victims and Defendants, 94 MASS. L. REv. 23, 23

(2011) (discussing unavailability of protection orders prior to Chapter 258E); see also supra notes

3-4 and accompanying text (discussing lack of protections prior to Chapter 258E).

88 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing lack of protections prior to 258E).
89 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476-78 (discussing sexual assault victims'

inability to obtain protection order prior to Chapter 258E).
90 See VICTM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-9 (discussing criminal stay-away
orders); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 476 (explaining stay-away orders issued in context

of criminal cases);.

91 See VICTM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7,

at 3-9 (discussing consequences for violation
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was on-going, and were only available to those victims who chose to
participate in the criminal justice process.9 2
Alternatively, a victim could have also sought a traditional
injunction in superior court. 93 Filing for a traditional injunction, however,
"is time-consuming, expensive, and generally requires the assistance of a

lawyer. 94 Most importantly, a violation of this type of injunctive relief is
not automatically a criminal offense, but rather, is enforced only through
contempt of court. 95 Therefore, a perpetrator could continually violate a
civil injunction and be subject only to contempt of court charges,
"providing a weak deterrent at best and leaving the victim with little
recourse." 96 Furthermore, the process for obtaining a civil injunction
.exposes the victim to greater contact with the perpetrator without any
consummate protection., 97
As such, civil injunctions provided
"significantly less protection in case of a violation than the abuse

of stay-away orders issued in criminal cases).
92 See id.
(detailing violation of stay-away orders issued in criminal case).
93 See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23 (discussing option of filing traditional
injunction prior to Chapter 258E); Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 477 (listing process for
seeking injunctive relief in Massachusetts Superior Court); see also MASS. R. Civ. P. 65
(enumerating requirements for superior court injunction).
94 Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23 (discussing civil injunction process). In
Massachusetts, "[t]he requirements for preliminary injunctive relief are: 1) the likelihood of
success on the merits; 2) the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is not issued;
and 3) the absence of irreparable harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted." Seidman &
Vickers, supra note 24, at 478 n.56 (citing Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Danahy, 488 N.E.2d
22, 26 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986)). Furthermore, this process requires the payment of a "security" in
an amount to be determined by the court, for the payment of costs that may accrue to the adverse
party "who is found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." See MASS. R. Civ. P. 65
(requiring payment of "security"). This cost could be upwards of hundreds of dollars. See FlynnPoppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23 n.8 (noting average filing fees for civil injunction as
$395.00); David Abel, Restraining-OrderFilings Unbound, BOS. GLOBE, April 12, 2011, at Al
(discussing cost of hundreds of dollars to obtain civil injunction in superior court).
95 See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23. In order to seek enforcement of a civil
injunction after a violation, the plaintiff must initiate a contempt of court proceeding. MASS. R.
Civ. P. 65.3. To do so, the plaintiff must file a complaint for contempt with the clerk of the court
where the order has been violated. Id.The defendant must be served with a summons and be
given an opportunity to file an answer to the complaint. Id. The parties will then conduct
discovery, and then a trial may be held. Id.Furthermore, the standard for contempt is based on a
"clear and undoubted disobedience of a clear and unequivocal comment," and must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-8 (quoting Peggy
Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 532 N.E.2d 54, 55 (Mass. 1989)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
96 Brief Amici Curiae of the Victim Rights Law Center et al., at 7-8, O'Brien v. Borowski,
No. SJC-10866 (Mass. filed Oct. 17, 2011), 2011 WI 5118359, at *7-8; see also Flynn-Poppey &
Abhar, supra note 87, at 23 (discussing penalties for violation of civil
injunctions).
97 Brief Amici Curiae of the Victim Rights Law Center et al. at 8, O'Brien, No. SJC-10866,
2011 WL 5118359, at *8.
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IV. MASSACHUSETTS'S RESPONSE TO THE "GLARING
LOOPHOLE"99
A. Legislative History of Chapter258E
The dangers of stalking served as the original catalyst that initiated
the dialogue advocating for the expansion of Chapter 209A protections to
victims who did not qualify under the statute. 100 In 2000, the death of a

Massachusetts woman, Sandra Berfield, made major headlines after Steven
S. Caruso, a man who had stalked her for two years prior to her death,
killed her by placing a package bomb on her doorstep. 101 Although Caruso
engaged in repeated violent and threatening acts against Berfield, the two
had no pre-existing relationship: they had never dated, were not related,
and were not living together. 10 2 Berfield's death exposed an enormous gap
in the existing Massachusetts protection order legislation, because despite
attempting to obtain a Chapter 209A protection order against Caruso,
Berfield did not have the requisite relationship to obtain that protection

order, and her petition was denied. 103 In response, the Massachusetts
Legislature began drafting a statute that would allow victims who had 0no
4
prior relationship with their perpetrators to obtain an order of protection.
Drafters of the statute originally intended the law to protect only
victims of stalking and harassment. 105 However, when the Boston law firm
Mintz, Levin, Cohn, Ferris, Glovsky and Popeo, P.C. ("Mintz Levin")
accepted the case of Jane, discussed above, they soon discovered that
98 See Seidman & Vickers, supra note 24, at 478 (discussing "cumbersome" enforcement of
traditional injunctions and inadequate remedies for sexual assault victims).
99 See Guilfoil, supra note 2 (quoting Governor Deval Patrick on benefits of new law).
100 See id. (discussing ten-year dialogue on creation of stalking protections).
101 See J. Thomas Kirkman, Every Breath You Take: Massachusetts Steps Up Its Efforts to

Stop Stalkers, 85 MASS. L. REV. 174, 174 (2001) (discussing death of Sandra Berfield by bomb
left by her stalker); Guilfoil, supra note 2 (discussing 2000 death of victim Sandra Berfield).
102

See Editorial, Harassment Orders May Cause More Problems Than They Solve, MASS.

WKLY., Dec. 13, 2010, at 38 (discussing lack of prior relationship between perpetrator and
victim); Kirkman, supra note 101, at 174 (discussing no prior relationship between Berfield and
Caruso); Dave Wedge, House Votes Protectionsfor Victims of Stalkers, BOS. HERALD, Jan. 29,
2010, at 14 (describing Caruso's threatening behavior and lack of relationship with Berfield).
103 See Brief Amici Curiae of the Victim Rights Law Center et al. at 3, O'Brien v. Borowski,
No. SJC-10866 (Mass. filed Oct. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 5118359, at *5; Flynn-Poppey & Abhar,
supra note 87, at 23 (explaining rationale for Ms. Berfield's Chapter 209A denial); Wedge, supra
note 102 (discussing Ms. Berfield's inability to obtain restraining order against Caruso).
104 See Guilfoil, supra note 2 (outlining beginnings of drafting process).
105 See id. (discussing roots of bill).
LAW.
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victims of sexual assault needed the same protections as victims of
stalking, because sexual assault victims faced identical barriers when they
were not related to, living with, or romantically involved with their
assailant. 10 6 Attorneys at Mintz Levin then joined the legislative drafting
team to ensure that the law also included victims of sexual assault. 107 The

statute faced many barriers to enactment, and its passage took the
Massachusetts Legislature nearly ten years. 108 Governor Deval Patrick
signed the bill into law on February 9, 2010, and it came into effect on May
10, 2010.109

B. Protectionsfor Sexual Assault Victims Under Chapter258E
The Chapter 258E Harassment Prevention Order allows any person

suffering from "harassment" to file for protection. 11 The statute provides
three definitions for harassment."' The first, aimed at protecting victims of
106 See id. (discussing barriers Mintz Levin faced with sexual assault client); see also supra
note 2 and accompanying text (detailing history of Jane's case).
107 See Guilfoil, supra note 2 (discussing Mintz Levin's involvement in drafting process);

Healy, supra note 3 (discussing Mintz Levin's involvement in redrafting of statute); John J.
Monahan, New Law Fights Stalkers, Abusers, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, Mass.), Feb.
10, 2010, at Al (discussing Mintz Levin's taking Aead" of final drafting process on pro bono
basis).
108See Guilfoil, supra note 2 (marking enactment of bill as "the culmination of a decade's
worth of effort"); Healy, supra note 3 (noting "10-year legislative effort" in passing bill). The
bill was "repeatedly stalled" and re-filed in the legislature every year since 2000. See Wedge,
supra note 102 (discussing ten-year refiling process). Many of the early opponents expressed
"drafting concerns" over the language of the original bill and were worried that the law "would
suffer constitutional infirmities in its application of vague language." Healy, supra note 3
(discussing ten-year opposition to passage of law). In addition to concerns that the law would
limit civil liberties and leave it susceptible to exploitation and misapplication (such as neighbors
seeking orders against one another), other opponents believed that the existing legislation offered
enough protection to victims of stalking and sexual assault. See Baker, supra note 44 (discussing
barriers to passage of statute). However, on February 4, 2010, both the Massachusetts House of
Representatives and Senate passed the bill unanimously. See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note
87, at 23 (discussing passage of bill). The passage of Chapter 258E was the first time in many
years that "legislation with criminal implications" passed unanimously in both the Massachusetts
House of Representatives and Senate. Id.
109 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, §§ 1-10 (2010); Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87,
at 23 (discussing signing of "An Act to Prevent Harassment" into law); Patrick Press Release,
supra note 34 (announcing signing of harassment prevention order bill into law); Memorandum
from Hon. Lynda M. Connolly, C.J. of the Dist. Ct. to Dist. Ct. Judges, Clerk-Magistrates and
Chief
Prob.
Officers
(Apr.
13,
2010),
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/trans1 042-1 46harassmentprevention-orders-glc-258e.pdf [hereinafter Judicial Guidelines] (indicating upcoming changes to
Massachusetts restraining order law).
110 Ch. 258E, § 3 (discussing remedies under protection order).
111 Ch. 258E, § 1 (enumerating types of harassment).
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stalking, requires "[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct

aimed at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property." 1 12 The second definition,
applying to non-domestic violence victims of sexual assault, defines

harassment as one act that "by force, threat or duress causes another to
involuntarily engage in sexual relations.""' The third definition, intended
to protect victims of various crimes that do not fall within the first two

definitions, defines harassment as one act that "constitutes a violation" of a
number of enumerated sexually-based criminal offenses. 114
The process for obtaining a Chapter 258E protection order is
largely modeled after the process for obtaining a Chapter 209A protection
order, and intends to give similar protections to victims of harassment and

sexual assault. 115 A difference between the two statutes exists, however, in
that the standard under Chapter 258E is higher than that under Chapter
209A. 116 Specifically, to obtain an order under Chapter 258E, the plaintiff

112
113
114

Id.
id.
Id. The offenses include indecent assault and battery, rape, assault with intent to commit

rape, enticement of child under age sixteen, stalking, criminal harassment, and drugging persons
for sexual intercourse. Id.
115 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, §§ 3, 5 (2010) (discussing process for obtaining
Chapter 258E protection order), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, §§ 3, 4 (2010) (stating process
for obtaining Chapter 209A protection order). See generally Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee Tracy
A. Lawrence at 11, Lawrence v. Gauthier, No. 2011-P-0924 (Mass. App. Ct. filed Aug. 10, 2011),
2011 WL 3806932, at *11 ("The Legislature created G.L. 258E to enable victims of stalking to
obtain injunctive relief from the district courts where restraining orders under G.L. 209A were not
available."); Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 25 ("To maintain consistency in
Massachusetts restraining order law, the drafters utilized 209A as a template for 258E."); Judicial
Guidelines, supra note 109 ("The procedures in Chapter 258E for harassment prevention orders
are largely parallel to those for abuse prevention orders in G.L. c. 209A, although the two statutes
differ in their eligibility provisions and available relief."). In fact, an early version of Chapter
258E was dubbed "209A V." Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 25. Like Chapter 209A,
the plaintiff seeking the protection order begins the process by filing an ex parte complaint in
court. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 3(a) (2010) (discussing initiation of Chapter 258E
complaint procedure).
116 See Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee Tracy A. Lawrence at 12, Lawrence, No. 2011-P-0924,
2011 WL 3806932, at *12 ("[T]he Legislature choose [sic] not to include the [Chapter 209A]
definition of abuse in G.L. c. 258E § 1."); Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23
("Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258E ... implemented a standard higher than that
required for the issuance of an abuse prevention order."); Editorial, A Welcome New Law in Mass.
Aimed at Stalkers, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Apr. 5, 2010, at 38 (discussing higher standard under
Chapter 258E than under Chapter 209A); Healy, supra note 3 (discussing same). The inclusion
of a higher standard for Chapter 258E "was not an arbitrary decision but rather a result of the
collaborative efforts of legislators, the trial court department, district attorneys, law enforcement
officials, criminal defense attorneys, victims' rights advocacy groups, public defenders, and a
private law firm to ensure that the legislation would be implemented appropriately." Flynn-
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must show "a substantial likelihood of immediate danger of harassment,"
whereas under Chapter 209A, the plaintiff must only prove "a substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse."" 7
Under the Chapter 209A definition of "abuse," the plaintiff need
only demonstrate that the defendant "attempt[ed] to cause or caus[ed]
physical harm" or "plac[ed] another in fear of imminent serious physical
harm."" 8 Chapter 258E, in contrast, "does not have a requirement that the
plaintiff fear serious physical harm."" 9 Rather, under the Chapter 258E
definition of "harassment," the plaintiff must prove either (a) "[three] or
more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed at a specific person
committed with the intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property and that does in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to
property," (b) one act that "by force, threat or duress causes another to
involuntarily engage in sexual relations," or (c) one act that "constitutes 120a
violation" of one of the enumerated sexually based criminal offenses.
By requiring a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct satisfies the
definition of "harassment," Chapter 258E imposes
a "much more
12 1
significant burden on the plaintiff' than Chapter 209A.
If the plaintiff meets the burden under Chapter 258E, the court may
enter a temporary order "to protect the plaintiff from harassment" without
the presence of the defendant. 122 However, the court must schedule a
hearing within ten days, at which time the defendant will be provided "an
opportunity to be heard on the question of continuing the temporary
order." 23 If the court determines that the plaintiff is in continuing need of
protection from harassment, the court may enter an order of protection for a
period of up to one year, at which time the order expires. 24 When the
order expires, the parties must reappear in court, and a hearing is held to

Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 23.
117 Ch. 209A, § 4; ch. 258E, § 5;see also Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee Tracy A. Lawrence
at 12, Lawrence, No. 2011-P-0924, 2011 WL 3806932, at *12 (discussing standard differences
between Chapter 209A and Chapter 258E); Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 25
(enumerating difference between Chapter 209A and Chapter 258E standards).
118 See ch. 209A, § 1 (enumerating definition of "abuse"); see also Flynn-Poppey & Abhar,
supra note 87, at 25 (discussing definition of "abuse" under Chapter 209A).
119 Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee Tracy A. Lawrence at 24, Lawrence, No. 2011-P-0924,
2011 WL 3806932, at *24.
120 See ch. 258E, § 1; see also Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 25 (discussing
standard under Chapter 258E).
121 Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 25 (explaining heightened standard under
Chapter 258E).
122 See ch. 258E, § 5 (discussing issuance of temporary orders).
123 See id.(discussing process for ten-day hearing).
124 See id.§ 3(d) (discussing initial relief period of granted order).
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"determine whether or not to extend the order for any additional time
reasonably necessary to protect the plaintiff or to enter a permanent
order. ,125
Similar to Chapter 209A, Chapter 258E enumerates a number of
remedies that the issuing judge may provide for in the order. 126 These
remedies include ordering the defendant to stop abusing the plaintiff, to
stop harassing the plaintiff, to cease contact with the plaintiff, and to stay
away from the plaintiff s home or workplace. 127 The statute also allows for
the payment of monetary damages to the plaintiff for losses suffered as a
result of the harassment. 128 The proceedings for issuing a Chapter 258E
order of protection, like Chapter 209A, are civil; however, a violation of
the order is criminal in nature. 129 Additionally, a violation of the order is
punishable by a fine of up to $5000 or imprisonment of up to two and a
half years, or both. 3 0
C. Chapter258E in Practice
Before Chapter 258E came into effect in May 2010, commentators
praised the law for its even-handed approach to a difficult issue.' 3' At its
signing, many considered the law a collaborative bipartisan success and
brought together various group from the community, including advocates,
law enforcement, and "both sides of the defense/prosecution divide. ,' An
editorial analyzing the new law stated, that "certain law makers deserve
credit for a new statute regarding restraining
orders that is both noble in its
33
design and appropriate in its scope."1
125

See id. (discussing rehearing process after expiration of order).

Like Chapter 209A,

Chapter 258E specifically states "[t]he fact that harassment has not occurred during the pendency
of an order shall not, in itself, constitute sufficient ground for denying or failing to extend the
order, or allowing an order to expire or be vacated or for refusing to issue a new order." Id.
126 See id. § 3 (enumerating remedies).
127 See ch. 258E, § 3(a)(i)-(iii) (enumerating remedies allowed in Chapter 258E order).
128 See id.§ 3(a)(iv) (permitting payment of monetary damages to plaintiff).
129 See ch. 258E, § 4 (discussing civil nature of proceedings and criminal nature of
violation).
130 See id.§ 9 (enumerating penalties for violation of order).
131 See A Welcome New Law in Mass. Aimed at Stalkers, supra note 116 ("[C]ertain
lawmakers deserve credit for a new statute regarding restraining orders that is both noble in its
design and appropriate in its scope.").
132 See id.(discussing credit due to lawmakers); see also Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note
87, at 23 (discussing many different
note 3 (viewing enactment of law as
note 34 (quoting bill Representative
aisle").
133 See A Welcome New Law in

groups involved in Chapter 258E's creation); Healy, supra
"a show of lawmaking unity"); Patrick Press Release, supra
Cory Atkins's view on cooperation "from both sides of the
Mass. Aimed at Stalkers, supra note 116 (discussing praise
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However, since its enactment, the law has faced significant
criticism of its implementation in practice. 134 Much of the criticism focuses
on the large number of complaints filed by people not perceived as the
"intended beneficiaries" of the statute.135 However, this criticism has
largely not concerned the sexual assault prong of the harassment order. 136
In addition to the number of complaints being filed by "unintended
13 7
beneficiaries," the statute's constitutionality has also come into question.
As of the date of publication of this article, a challenge to Chapter 258E's
constitutionality is being reviewed by the Supreme Judicial Court of

Massachusetts.138

This challenge

focuses on whether the

statute

unconstitutionally prohibits protected speech.13 9
Furthermore, the
challenge is based on an argument that is only applicable to the first prong

of the statute .14

However, the challenge appears to be directed at the

entirety of the statute, including the prong relating to a single act of sexual

assault. 141

and success for new legislation); see also Phillip Bantz, New HarassmentOrders Abused, Clerks
Complain, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Dec. 6, 2010, at 1 (discussing initial widespread praise of
legislation).
134 See, e.g., Abel, supra note 94 (discussing "surge" in restraining order filings
under
Chapter 258E); Bantz, supra note 133 (discussing perceptions of misuse of statute); Harassment
Orders May Cause More Problems Than They Solve, supra note 102 (noting reach of statute is
"troublingly broad"); Steven E. Kramer, Letter to the Editor, HarassmentProtection Statute is
Being Abused, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 12, 2010, at 39 (discussing abuse of statute since
passage).
135 See Kramer, supra note 134 (discussing abuse of statute); see also Abel, supra note
94
(discussing court officials' dissatisfaction with number of complaints). Much of the negative
focus on the statute concerns the number of complaints that are filed by angry neighbors,
dissatisfied business partners, and other acquaintances with disagreements. See Harassment
Orders May Cause More Problems Than They Solve, supra note 102 (discussing types of
complaints commonly sought).
136 See supra notes 134-35135 (outlining criticism of statute).
137 See Brief and Record Appendix of Appellant, Robert O'Brien at 8, O'Brien v. Borowski,
No. 2010-10866 (Mass. filed Jan. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 5118357, at *8 (enumerating
constitutional argument).
138 See id. (outlining request for review by Supreme Judicial Court). The case arose from the
issuance of a Chapter 258E order against the appellant, Robert O'Brien, filed by the plaintiffappellee, Alan Borowski.
Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff-Appelle Borowski is a Northampton,
Massachusetts police officer who filed for a Harassment Prevention Order after a series of
interactions with O'Brien in which he felt threatened. Id. at 3. Appellant O'Brien appealed the
order, claiming that "(1) the harassment prevention statute is unconstitutionally overbroad to the
extent that it covers protected speech; and (2) the acts complained of in Borowski's application
for prevention order constituted protected free speech." Id. at 2.
139 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts at 4,
Borowski v. O'Brien, No. SJC-10866 (Mass. filed Nov. 3, 2011), 2011 WL 5564203, at *4
(announcing constitutional argument).
140 See id. at *4 (outlining constitutional argument).
141 See Brief and Record Appendix of Appellant, Robert O'Brien at 15, O'Brien, No. SJC-
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Although Chapter 258E appears to be under attack, it is
unquestionably working for victims of sexual assault. 142 Proponents of the
law have noted that Chapter 258E "is probably one of the most important
laws on the books for sexual assault and rape ViCtimS."' 4 3 Although there
are no available statistics on the number of Chapter 258E orders granted
since the law's enactment, according to SAFEPLAN, 44 a Massachusetts
court advocate program that helps victims file for restraining orders, as of
July 2011, 119 sexual assault victims had requested Chapter 258E
protection orders through SAFEPLAN since enactment of the law. 45 This
number is in contrast to the 1,134 total number of Chapter 258E orders
filed through SAFEPLAN since the enactment of the law. 46 In addition, as
of January 2011, the Victim Rights Law Center, which is "a Boston nonprofit providing free legal services to sexual assault victims[,] has helped
over 30 sexual assault victims obtain these orders, with every single victim

10866 (Mass. filed Jan. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 5118357 (arguing statute is "constitutionally

deficient on its face").
142
143

See Abel, supra note 94 (discussing importance of law for sexual assault victims).
See Abel, supra note 94 (quoting Colby Bruno, managing attorney of Victim Rights Law

Center).
144

SAFEPLAN is a court advocacy program created by the Massachusetts Office for Victim

Assistance ("MOVA") in 1995.
SAFEPLAN, MASS. OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE,
http://mova.state.ma.us/what-we-do/mova-service-programs/safeplan (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
SAFEPLAN is a partnership between MOVA and community-based domestic violence programs,
through which SAFEPLAN Advocates are placed in district, probate and family courts
throughout the Commonwealth. SAFEPLAN FAQs, MASS. OFFICE FOR VICTIM ASSISTANCE,
http://mova.state.ma.us/what-we-do/mova-service-programs/safeplan/safeplan-faqs
(last visited
Jan. 29, 2012). SAFEPLAN works in collaboration with district attorneys' offices, courts, and
other allied criminal justice and social service agencies to provide a statewide system of court
advocacy for those victims of domestic violence who are considering a Chapter 209A restraining
order. Id. And, as of May 2010, SAFEPLAN assists victims of sexual assault or stalking who are
seeking a Chapter 258E Harassment Prevention Order. See SAFEPLAN, supra. SAFEPLAN
Advocates are currently located in Barnstable, Berkshire, Bristol, Franklin, Hampshire, Hampden,
Middlesex, Plymouth, and Worcester counties. SAFEPLAN Programs& Courts, MASS. OFFICE
FOR

VICTIM

ASSISTANCE,

http://mova. state.ma.us/what-we-do/mova-service-

programs/safeplan/safeplan-programs-a-courts (last visited Jan. 29, 2012). SAFEPLAN is fully
funded by a state line item, and three federal grants: VOCA, VAWA, and Byrne. Mass. Office
for
Victim
Assistance,
SAFEPLAN
Guidelines
Training
FY2011,
http://mova.state.ma.us/images/stories/SAFEPLAN/ 20Policies / 20and0/ 20Procedures / 20Train
ingFY201 lCOPY.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
145 See E-mail from Kristen Rappa, SAFEPLAN Program Coordinator, Mass. Office for
Victims Assistance, to author (Aug. 26, 2011, 15:55 EST) (on file with author) (describing
number of 258E orders sought in SAFEPLAN courts). SAFEPLAN does not assist every victim
filing for a protection order in the Massachusetts courts. Id. These numbers, therefore, do not
represent every protection order issued or granted within Massachusetts since enactment of
Chapter 258E. Id.
146 Id.
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V. ANALYSIS
The passage of Massachusetts General Law Chapter 258E was an
enormous step in providing victims of sexual assault access to a means of
protection from their attackers. 148 Without this law, sexual assault victims
would be left without the opportunity to protect themselves from the
continued threat of their attackers. 149 The law currently prevents exposure
to continued threats for many victims of sexual assault, and serves as an
invaluable resource for this group of victims who would not otherwise have

these protections. 50
Despite the obvious value that the statute provides to victims of

sexual assault, there are several critical problems with the statute as it
applies to sexual assault victims. 151 The first major problem with Chapter
258E is that the Massachusetts Legislature did not draft the statute with the
sexual assault victim in mind. 152
Rather, Massachusetts legislators
intended the statute to serve as-and it is still widely considered-a

"harassment protection order," 153
not a statute designed to provide sexual
protections.
with
assault victims

147

See Colby Bruno, Letter to the Editor, Groups Disappointedby Editorialon Harassment

Orders, MASS. LAW. WKLY., Jan. 10, 2011, at 47.

148 See supra notes 6, 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing major protections afforded to
victims of sexual assault through passage of Chapter 258E).
149 See supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text (discussing risks post-attack).
150 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing Chapter 258E statistics).
151 See infra notes 152-84 and accompanying text (outlining drafting problems inherent in

Chapter 258E).
152 See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67 (stating not written with victims in mind); see also
supra notes 100, 105-07107 and accompanying text (discussing original intention of Chapter
258E as applying to harassment victims).
153 See Brief of the Plaintiff-Appellee Tracy A. Lawrence at 11, Lawrence v. Gauthier, No.
2011-P-0924 (Mass. App. Ct. filed Aug. 10, 2011), 2011 WL 3806932, at *11 (stating intention
of law to protect only stalking victims); A Welcome New Law In Mass. Aimed at Stalkers, supra

note 116 (failing to mention sexual assault as eligible for Chapter 258E); Monahan, supra note
107 (discussing law as combating harassment and stalking with only vague mention of "abuse");
Kramer, supra note 134 (failing to mention sexual assault as eligible to obtain Chapter 258E). In
fact, much of the discourse surrounding the statute does not mention the fact that one instance of
sexual assault qualifies a person to obtain the order. Id. (same); see also A Welcome New Law In
Mass. Aimed at Stalkers, supra note 116 (failing to mention sexual assault as eligible for 258E);
Monahan, supra note 107 (discussing law as combating harassment and stalking with only vague
mention of "abuse"). Even the statute's name, "Harassment Prevention Order," does not refer to
sexual assault victims, and only a close reading into the definition of "harassment" reveals any
mention of sexual assault. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, §§ 1-10 (2010) (announcing name of
statute as "Harassment Prevention Orders").
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The problem with including sexual assault in a statute that is
largely intended as a harassment statute is that sexual assault is not
synonymous with harassment, and it implicates considerations different
than those encountered by harassment victims. 15 4 This problem becomes
evident when looking at the heightened standard imposed on victims under
Chapter 258E. 155 The standard was deliberately set higher than the
standard under Chapter 209A, in an attempt to prevent plaintiffs from
potentially abusing the statute and to "ensure that only those victims who
really needed protection in fact received it.', 156 However, the concerns
underlying the adoption of the heightened standard under Chapter 258Eneighbor arguments, "bar fights," "landlord tenant disputes," "minor
violent crimes," and other "frivolous reasons"-are not considerations that
are applicable to sexual assault victims. 57 Rather, claims for protection by
sexual assault victims, like those of domestic violence victims, are
158
inherently non-frivolous due to the serious violent nature of the crime.
The Massachusetts Legislature implicitly recognized this right by including
59
"one act" of sexual assault within the definition of "harassment.',
As a result, the standard under Chapter 258E leads to confusion
when it is applied to sexual assault victims. 160 Under the statute, a victim
of one instance of sexual assault may qualify for the order under the second
definition of "harassment," defined as "an act that ... by force, threat or
duress causes another to involuntarily engage in sexual relations.''
To
obtain the protection order, the plaintiff must demonstrate a "substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of harassment.', 62 However, it is unclear
from the statute whether a sexual assault victim who obtains an order under
the second definition of harassment may utilize the other two definitions of

154

See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67 (discussing differences in experience between

harassment and sexual assault victims).
155 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing heightened standard under
Chapter 258E than under Chapter 209A).
156 See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing motivations behind
including heightened standard under Chapter 258E).
157 See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 24 (discussing reasons behind adoption of
high standard under Chapter 258E).
158 See Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note 87, at 30 (distinguishing legislature's use of
different "branches" within Chapter 258E harassment definition).
159

See MASS.GEN. LAWS ch. 258E, § 1 (2010); see also Flynn-Poppey & Abhar, supra note

87, at 30 ("[U]nlike the first branch of harassment, the drafters were simply unwilling to require a
plaintiff to suffer more than one instance of sexual assault in order to qualify for protection from
the court.").
160
161
162

See infra notes 161-72 (discussing flaws in statute's drafting).
Ch. 258E, § 1 (defining eligibility under definition of harassment).
Id.§ 5 (defining standard).
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harassment to meet the statute's burden.
For instance, the statute would appear to require the sexual assault
plaintiff to prove that she is in a substantial likelihood of immediate danger
of the same type of "harassment" alleged when she initially filed the
order. 164 In other words, that she is in danger of "an act that ... by force,
threat or duress causes another to involuntarily engage in sexual
relations.' 65 However, many sexual assault victims may not be in a
substantial likelihood of being sexually assaulted again. 1 6 6 They may,
however, be vulnerable to harassment, intimidation,
or other physical or
67
attacker.1
their
of
hands
the
at
harm
psychological
Additionally, the statute is unclear as to whether a sexual assault
plaintiff who uses the second definition of harassment to qualify for the
order may utilize the first definition of harassment-"[three] or more acts
of willful and malicious conduct . . . with the intent to cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property"-to meet the statute's
burden.168 Even if the statute were to allow a sexual assault plaintiff to
utilize the first definition of harassment to meet her burden of proof, many
sexual assault victims would not qualify under this prong either. 169 Many
sexual assault victims do not experience the heightened level of stalking or
harassment that is required under the standard for Chapter 258E. 170 Many
do, however, experience continued contact with their assailant, which
although may not rise to the level of harassment as defined under Chapter
258E, is every bit as humiliating, frightening, and dangerous to 1the victim
17
as the behavior intended under the first prong of Chapter 258E.
While the standard under Chapter 258E is relevant to individuals
seeking protection from harassment, it imposes a strange burden on the
sexual assault plaintiff' 172 Due to the complexity of sexual assault, and the
163

See generally id. §§ 1, 5 (indicating lack of clarity under definition of harassment); see

also supra notes 116-17 (comparing and contrasting definitions of abuse and harassment in
Chapter 258E with Chapter 209A).
164 See generally ch.258E, §§ 1, 5 (enumerating standard of proof).
165 See id. § 1.
166 See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67 (indicating sexual assault victims may only be
assaulted once).
167

See supra notes 32-39, 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing safety risks and

psychological harm to victims post-assault).
168 See generally ch.258E, §§ 1, 5 (enumerating standard of proof).
169 See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67 (explaining lack of harassment experienced by some
victims).

170See id. (explaining experiences of sexual assault victims post-attack).
171

See id. (same).

172

See Bantz, supra note 133 (discussing heightened standard as mechanism to prevent
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varying experiences of its victims, a better standard for victims of sexual
assault would resemble the standard under Chapter 209A. 173 Under that
statute, a victim of domestic violence must prove a "substantial likelihood
of immediate danger of abuse," which means "physical harm, fear of
imminent harm, or causing another to engage involuntarily in sexual
relations by force threat or duress.' 74 Like domestic violence victims,
sexual assault victims also experience a range of emotions and reactions
following their attack that are distinct from those experienced by
harassment victims. 175 Some may be at risk of being sexually assaulted
again, while others may be at risk of intimidation, physical abuse, or other
frightening experiences. 76 Creating a standard that resembles the Chapter
209A standard, which is based on a "generalized fear" or risk of physical
harm, is much better tailored to the unique and often varied experiences of
77
the sexual assault victim. 1
In addition to the statute's intent and drafting, there are other
problems associated with Chapter 258E. 17 When protections for sexual
assault victims are classified incorrectly under a "harassment statute," such
a misclassification not only diminishes public awareness of the statute's
intentions, but also misleads eligible individuals into believing that the
statute does not offer them protection. 179
Furthermore, such a
mischaracterization of sexual assault within a harassment statute exposes
sexual assault victims to misdirected opposition.'"
Chapter 258E is
currently suffering from an onslaught of criticism, almost entirely directed
at the "harassment" prong of the statute.iS
This misdirected criticism
serves as a dangerous threat to the availability of protections for sexual
assault victims because it has led to a constitutional challenge of the statute
as a whole, currently under review by the Supreme Judicial Court of

frivolous complaints of harassment).
173 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 4 (2010) (enumerating standard as "substantial
likelihood of immediate danger of abuse").
174 See id. §§ 1, 4 (enumerating standard and definition of "abuse").
175 See supra notes 33-34, 46-49 (discussing experience of sexual assault victims).
176 See VICTIM RIGHTS LAW CTR., supra note 7, at 3-1 (describing experiences of sexual
assault victims post-attack).
177

See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing varying risks of harm sexual

assault victims face post-assault); see also Abel, supra note 94 (discussing suggestion Chapter
258E standard be "in fear of serious physical harm or financial harm").
178 See infra notes 179-84 (discussing additional problems with statute's intent and drafting).
179

See supra Part IV.B (discussing statute's focus on "harassment").

180 See Bantz, supra note 133 (discussing negative view of statute as being abused by those
other than sexual assault victims); Kramer, supra note 134 (discussing abuse of statute while
failing to mention sexual assault as eligible).
181 See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of statute).
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Massachusetts. 18 2 This constitutional challenge, although having the
potential to affect the entirety of the statute, is based on a claim brought
solely under the non-sexual assault definition of "harassment," and is only
applicable to that non-sexual assault definition of "harassment."' 83 If the
court strikes down the statute, sexual assault victims will lose the vital
protections that they so desperately need, solely because the crime of which
84
they are a victim is misclassified with an unrelated crime. 1
A specifically-tailored statute intended for sexual assault victims
would alleviate many of the aforementioned problems. 85 Several other

states have already enacted similar sexual assault-specific statutes that have
received wide acclaim. 8 6 A sexual assault-specific protection order statute

in Massachusetts with a standard based on the victim's generalized fear of
harm would create a standard that is appropriate to the crime of sexual
assault, and would alleviate the statutory confusion stemming from its
misclassification with an unrelated crime. 87 Such a statute would also
alleviate confusion about its intended purpose and may publicly attract

qualified victims who may not have been aware of their eligibility for
protection. 188 With a statute drafted specifically for sexual assault victims,
and having an appropriate standard based on generalized fear of harm,
sexual assault victims would be far better protected from the threat of their
attackers. 189

Though it has its problems, Chapter 258E is unquestionably

182 See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional challenge to
Chapter 258E).
183 See supra notes 137-41 (same).
184 See generally Brief Amici Curiae of the Victim Rights Law Center et al. at 7-8, O'Brien

v. Borowski, No. SJC-10866 (Mass. filed Oct. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 5118359, at *7-8 (outlining

argument against constitutional challenge, stating statute is necessary for protection of victims).
185 See generally Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 70-73 (arguing for sexual assault-specific
statutes).
186 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.90.005-.900 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012); Kirkbride,
supra note 48 (lauding Washington statute for providing specialized protections to sexual assault
victims); O'Connell, supra note 34, at 2 (praising Washington statute for providing protections to
sexual assault victims); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.046 (West 2007 & Supp. 2012)
(providing specialized cause of action for protection order for sexual assault victims); 740 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 22/102 (West 2010) (enumerating specialized sexual assault civil protection
order); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.378 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) (giving specialized civil
protection order protections to victims of sexual assault); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
7A.01 (West 2005 & Supp. 2011) (enumerating specialized sexual assault civil protection order).
187 See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text (discussing statutory confusion created by
law).
188 See supra text accompanying note 179 (discussing misleading victims); see also supra
Part IV.B.
189 See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67 (explaining need for sexual assault-specific statute).
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working for victims of sexual assault. 190 Judges seem to understand the
inherent intent of the statute, despite its actual language, and are
appropriately applying it to sexual assault victims. 191 However, so long as
sexual assault is included in a harassment statute with a standard that does
not correctly apply to them, sexual assault victims stand at risk of the
statute being read literally, thereby not obtaining the protections they need
and deserve. 192
Furthermore, sexual assault victims are continually
exposed to the negative reputation surrounding the "harassment" prong of
the statute.193 Such a negative reputation compounds the threat of the
statute being challenged or struck down, based on reasons unrelated to the
sexual assault prong of the statute. 194 To combat these concerns, the
Massachusetts Legislature should consider the protections afforded under
Chapter 258E, and evaluate whether the current statute is the best solution
for victims of sexual assault. 195 Rather than misclassify the problem under
harassment, and expose sexual assault victims to unintended criticism, the
Massachusetts Legislature should create a specialized protection order
96
specifically intended for victims of sexual assault.
VI. CONCLUSION
The enactment of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258E was
a major success that provides victims of sexual assault with vital
protections against their assailants. Sexual assault victims rarely see their
attackers brought to justice, and they are in need of a way to keep their
attackers from further harming or intimidating them. Although Chapter
258E is working well to provide victims of sexual assault with a
mechanism to protect them from potential harm, the statute could be
working better. As a hybrid statute drafted originally as a harassment
statute, Chapter 258E, as written, has the potential to deprive victims of
sexual assault of the protections they so desperately need. By creating a
narrowly tailored statute that is specifically intended for victims of sexual

190 See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (discussing success of statute for sexual
assault victims).

191See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing success of sexual assault victims

in obtaining Chapter 258E orders).
192

See supra notes 161-76 and accompanying text (discussing confusion stemming from

current drafting of statute).
193 See supra notes 134-35, 180-84 (analyzing negative criticism directed at statute).
194 See supra notes 134-35, 180-84 and accompanying text (same).
195 See supra notes
185-89 (outlining need for sexual-assault-specific statute

Massachusetts).
196

See Kirkbride, supra note 48, at 67; O'Connell, supranote 34, at 1.
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assault, Massachusetts could provide these victims with remedies that
would be more appropriate for the unique experience of sexual assault, and
the state could once again take its place in the forefront of victims' rights.
Hayley Jodoin

